Chinese Agricultural Reform, the WTO and FTA Negotiations by Shunli Yao
 
NO.E2006010     2006-7 
 
 





China Center for Economic Research 
Peking University 
 
No.  E2006010  July  7,  2006 
















China’s early industrialization  created  distortions.  This paper identifies major 
distortions in the Chinese economy in the pre-reform era and brings agricultural 
distortions into perspective.    Comparison is made of the reform experiences in 
Chinese industry and agriculture.    It suggests that with limited arable land, it is 
difficult to align Chinese agricultural production fully with its comparative 
advantage without also reforming China’s grain policy.    Reform has 
substantially freed up agricultural production but border distortions serve as one 
of a few remaining effective measures to ensure the grain self-sufficiency target.   
Unlike agricultural protections in rich countries, China’s grain self-sufficiency 
policy has much weaker institutional underpinnings and is susceptible to the 
influence of interest groups.    The patterns of Chinese agricultural trade explain 
its ambiguous positions in WTO agriculture negotiations.    In terms of grain 
sectoral adjustment, a possible comprehensive China-Australia FTA is 
consistent with the multilateral process, while the China-ASEAN FTA is not.   
There is no evidence that the China-ASEAN FTA helps with the WTO 
agriculture negotiations, particularly when rice is excluded from the deal; but 
China-Australia FTA could generate competitive liberalization in grain trade, 
and thus help with the global agricultural liberalization.   
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As a WTO member, China
1  has become part of the multilateral trade negotiations.   
At the regional level, China has also entered negotiations with the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia, New Zealand and Chile for free trade 
agreements (FTA).    Agriculture is a contentious issue in all those talks.    As the 
largest developing member and a key trader in agricultural products, China’s positions 
in and their implications for WTO agriculture negotiations and regional FTA talks 
have received much attention.    To understand all those issues, one has to understand 
the role of Chinese agriculture in its national economic development, as well as 
economic and political factors that help shape Chinese agricultural trade policy.   
This paper first reviews Chinese industrialization process and identifies major 
distortions under central planning in Section 2.    Section 3 compares Chinese 
agricultural and industrial reforms with a focus on agricultural trade.  Section  4 
discusses the political economy of Chinese agricultural trade policy and speculates 
about its future development.    Section 5 explains Chinese negotiation positions on 
agricultural issues in the WTO and evaluates the China-ASEAN FTA.    Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Distortions in the pre-reform Chinese economy 
 
At the mid 20th century when People’s Republic was founded, China was an agrarian 
economy with an under-developed industrial sector.    Eager to catch up with the 
Western powers, like most developing countries at that time, China adopted a strategy 
that emphasized the development of industrial sectors
2.    Agriculture was only in a 
position to serve this development strategy.  Nationalization  of  the  fledging 
industrial and commercial enterprises together with collectivization of the rural 
economy made it possible for the Government to effectively carry out this strategy, 
following the Soviet model of central planning in its management of the national 
economy.    Except for the early 1950s when the country received aid from the former 
Soviet Union, China was isolated from rest of the world until 1979.    As a result, 
China’s early industrialization had to be internally financed.    In addition to budget 
outlay bulk of which went to industrial investment, the Government set low wage for 
industrial workers, high price for industrial and low price for agricultural products as 
an implicit tax to divert agricultural revenues and private savings into industrial 
sectors.    As such, agricultural sector was depressed. 
 
To develop industrial infrastructure at the expense of agriculture was a common 
practice in most post World War II developing countries.    But in China, it was not 
just a matter of economic policy or development strategy.    At play was also the way 
                                                        
1  Throughout this paper, China refers to mainland China excluding Hong Kong and Macao, as a 
customs entity.    Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are identified as independent customs entities. 
2  For a thorough analysis of this “catch up” strategy, see Lin, Cai and Li (2003).   1
political status was granted to various social groups.    According to Chinese 
Constitution, it is not peasants but workers in mostly state-own industrial sector who 
are given the leading class status in the Chinese  political  establishment.  It  was 
customary for communist countries to regard proletariat workers as the vanguard of 
the regimes, because most revolutions took place in cities and the industrial workers 
formed the backbone of the communist military forces.    Therefore, orthodox 
communist ideology commends proletariat workers.    In China, however, it was 
peasants who supported the rural-based Chinese Communist Party in the Civil War 
against city-based Nationalists.    In light of this, Chinese Constitution surprisingly 
put proletariat workers above peasants in Chinese political life.    But it could be 
understood as a convenient way for the Government to lend its political support for 
the industrialization campaign and at the same time align itself with orthodox 
communist ideology. 
 
Wages for Chinese workers were low by international standards but enviable in the 
eye of peasants.    Workers in state-own enterprises (SOEs) also enjoyed free housing, 
free health care and guaranteed job security.    Later in the reform era when laid-off 
workers typically lose those perks, outcry pours in and the pace of SOEs reform has to 
be slowed down.    In contrast, the under-represented Chinese peasants have never 
received the same treatment.    Among examples of anecdotal evidence, in one 
incident, a rural housewife had to resort to the personal intervention of the Chinese 
Prime Minister through an accidental encounter to help her husband, a migrant worker 
at an urban construction site, to get back his (and million others’) long overdue wage 
payment.    The Chinese legal system itself should have been able to handle this case, 
but obviously it did not live up to the expectation of “justice for all”, including the 
under-represented. 
 
Biased resource allocation at the national level between agriculture and manufacturing 
was only one of many distortions pervasive in China’s central planning system at that 
time.    Within manufacturing sector, priority was given to heavy industries that 
produce investment goods, over light industries that produce consumer goods; within 
agricultural sector, grain production was emphasized to ensure adequate food supply 
for the country. 
 
Normally, the catch-up strategy would also require an import substitution trade policy 
that effectively prevents a country from engaging in international trade to its fullest 
potential.    In China’s case, the US-led UN embargo against the new communist 
regime in the 1950s forced the country to make “self-reliance and self-sufficiency” 
the cornerstone of its foreign trade policy.    In agriculture, policy-induced 1958-60 
famine further reinforced the conviction of the Chinese leadership that “grain 
self-sufficiency” should become the principle of utmost importance in agricultural 
trade policy making. 
   2
For the purpose of building up an industrial infrastructure in a short period of time, 
this development strategy had its own merit.    However, for a country with scarce 
capital and land resource but abundant labor supply, the strategy was against its 
comparative advantage and only viable when foreign trade was restricted. 
 
Emphasis on heavy industries and grain production did help boost productions, 
though apparently far below their potentials.
3    However, intrinsic flaws of central 
planning also created severe problems, such as structural imbalance of the national 
economy and lack of incentives on the part of producers.    By the end of the 1970s, 
the economy was such a shambles that it prompted the government to embark on 
reform that has profoundly transformed the Chinese economy forever. 
 
3. Chinese reform and agricultural trade 
 
Chinese reform has been a gradual process.    At the beginning, the reform aimed to 
improve the efficiency of the system within the central planning framework, and 
market elements were introduced as supplements.    Since early 1990s, market has 
been increasingly gaining legitimacy in the official reform blueprint and bold 
initiatives were introduced to correct various distortions.    The reform has resulted in 
economic growth in both agricultural and industrial sectors. 
 
Agricultural reform resembles industry reform in many aspects.    Household 
responsibility system was first introduced in early 1980s to boost farmers’ incentives 
in agricultural production, and similar responsibility system was later applied to 
enterprises.  As  a  quasi privatization measure, land tenure system was instituted to 
ensure farmers of the rights to keep the land for 20 years, while in enterprises reform, 
share-holding system gave workers stakes in firms’ production performance.    Most 
commodity prices were freed up, subject only to market forces.    Grain production 
was still the priority in agriculture.    But instead of mandatory production quota sold 
to the government at lower than market price (the procurement practice during most 
of the reform years), price support program has been put in place to encourage grain 
production, though most of the time, market prices are higher than the minimal 
procurement prices.    For Chinese peasants, this change in procurement policy helps 
transfer grain revenue from grain marketing bureaus to grain growers, and is a 
positive move as far as peasant’s income is concerned. 
 
Liberalization has unleashed the potentials of labor-intensive production in both 
agriculture and industry.    In agriculture, development of horticulture, poultry, dairy 
and animal husbandry sectors has helped diversify the diet of the population, and also 
increased  peasants’  income.  In  industry, development of consumer goods sectors 
and integration with the international production chain through foreign trade, 
particularly under the processing trade regime, has changed the Chinese industrial 
                                                        
3  High growth rate under central planning was mainly due to more input use but often came with low 
productivity gain, a point that has been made popular by Krugman (1994).   3
make-up.    As a result, within both agriculture and industry, distortions due to 
over-emphasis of grain production and heavy industry in pre-reform era have been 
substantially reduced, though more needs to be done to the factor markets. 
 
However, despite of much liberalization of the Chinese economy throughout the 
reform era, the patterns that tax agriculture to subsidize industry did not change until 
as recently as this year (i.e. 2006).    Despite overall economic growth, the rural-urban 
divide has further increased (the urban-rural per capita income ratio reached over 3:1 
in 2005!).    To correct this disparity, China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan has included 
“New Rural Development (NRD)” program into its platform, which aims to give rural 
development a higher priority.    One immediate policy reform is to abolish all fees 
and taxes associated with agricultural production.  This  is  a  very significant move, 
because it is the first time in several thousand years’ Chinese history that no tax and 
fees are imposed on peasants.    This reflects the determination of the Chinese 
leadership to deal with the rural backwardness, which is a long overdue task.    But it 
remains to be seen how far this campaign can go, as the NRD campaign comes as a 
top-down approach.    It is not initiated, monitored or run by rural residents, the 
potential beneficiaries and therefore may deviate from its original objectives along the 
course of implementation.    After all, NRD supporters have to compete for resources 
with other more politically powerful constituencies.   
 
In China, arable land is scarce and so is capital.    But unlike arable land, capital can 
be borrowed from abroad.    This simple fact explains the different ways in which 
structural adjustment has been achieved in both agriculture and industry.    In 
agriculture, with a slight increase in total sown area, additional land use for 
horticulture has been met mainly by a smaller sown area for grain (Figure 1), a 
reflection of China’s changing policy on “grain self-sufficiency” (from 100% down to 
95%).    The declining grain acreage has been met by productivity gain at the same 
time.    The Household Responsibility System gave a once for all boost for grain 
production in the early 1980s.    Agricultural R&D investment, made mostly in grain 
sector and some in the pre-reform era, started to show its impact in the reform years.   
However, since the 1990s, grain yield has been mainly fueled by more inputs rather 
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Source: China Statistics Yearbook and FAO Database, various years 
 
Correction of distortions within industry takes a different route.    While many small 
SOEs have been privatized, medium and large SOEs are mostly intact and keep 
receiving generous state subsidies.    Without substantial reform in SOEs, Chinese 
industrial make-up has been transformed by the emergence of a vibrant non-state 
sector that includes private, collective and foreign funded industrial enterprises.   
While the private and collective enterprises are struggling to raise money for their 
operations, foreign funded enterprises have brought in huge amounts of capital in the 
form of foreign direct investment (FDI).    As of today, China is the top recipient of 
FDI in the world.    Of course, release of rural surplus labor has also contributed to the 
development of labor-intensive industries.    As a result, in 2005, SOEs contributed 
only 1/3 to the total industrial GDP in China.    In contrast, because agricultural 
production solely relies on local factors (land and labor, etc), its structural make-up 
has not changed very much compared to industrial production.    The share of grain 
and other land intensive crops (soy and cotton) still make up as much as 70% of 
Chinese sown areas in 2002.
4 
 
How far has the correctional process gone in Chinese agriculture?    To answer this 
question, let’s make some international comparison with Brazil, a country with similar 
size but quite different labor/land endowment ratio.    As discussed in Jales et al 
(2005), in the past thirty years, reduction of state intervention, market deregulation 
and trade liberalization combined with R&D investment and macro stabilization have 
helped modernize Brazilian agriculture and agribusiness.    Now Brazil has one of the 
most liberalized agricultural trade regimes in the world (Table 1).    China is also quite 
liberalized as far as tariffs are concerned, but its agricultural trade patterns are also 




                                                        
4  If measured by actual arable areas, this number will be smaller, as sown areas in the Chinese statistics 
are based on single cropping for horticulture but multiple cropping for grain.   5
Table 1: Applied Tariff Structures for Brazil, China and Other Countries 
BRAZIL 
(2003)
CHINA      
(2002)
USA        
(2003)
EU         
(2003)
INDIA       
(2002)
Mean 10.2 15.3 12.3 29.3 36.9
Median 10.0 13.0 4.4 14.4 30.0
Standard deviation 6.0 11.5 29.6 40.2 25.8
Variation coefficient 0.58 0.75 2.40 1.37 0.70
Maximum tariff 55.0 71.0 350.0 277.2 182.0
# of tariff lines 959 1044 1829 2091 690
# of tariff lines = 0 79 80 388 403 17
# of tarif lines > 30% 4 130 167 633 108
 
Sources: MDIC-Brazil, USITC, TARIC-EU and WTO, cited in Jales et al (2005) page 10 
 
China has 154.6 million hectare arable land compared to 54.5 million hectare in 
Brazil.    At the same time, China’s total employment is 737.1 million v.s. Brazil’s 
66.2 million (Jales et al,  2005).  Those  numbers  suggest  that if Chinese agriculture 
were sufficiently open to international trade, production of its labor-intensive versus 
land-intensive agricultural products should have exhibited a pattern that is in sharp 
contrast with that of Brazil.    In fact, Figure 2, which depicts the composition of total 
Brazilian and Chinese planted area in 2002, shows striking similarities in farmland 
composition for land- versus labor-intensive crops (7:3 for cereal and oil-bearing 
crops versus horticulture, etc.) in the two countries.    This simple comparison 
suggests that Chinese agriculture has not been fully integrated into the world economy.   
Barriers to trade in various forms, policy-induced or natural ones are to blame.   
Chinese agriculture mostly consists of smallholders on subsistence farming who have 
not been brought into domestic market.    Obviously, there is still a long way to go to 
completely integrate Chinese agriculture into domestic and international markets. 
 
Figure 2: Composition of Planted Area in Brazil and China (2002) 
 
Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), China Statistics Yearbook, and 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) as cited in Jales et al (2005) page 22   6
 
The different ways the government supports grain sector and SOEs do have 
ramification for trade reform.    With a broad tax base including non-state sector (and 
until recently agriculture) and the dwindling share of SOEs in the national economy, it 
is financially manageable for the government to subsidize SOEs through easy loans 
and enable them to survive competitions from non-state sectors as well as imports.   
Trade liberalization in manufacture sectors can make the life of SOEs miserable but 
does not necessarily threaten their existence.    In contrast, the viability of the price 
support program that has been instituted to ensure “grain self-sufficiency” and the 
“grain self-sufficiency” target itself require a protectionist grain trade policy.    The 
economic logic is that liberalizing border measures (improved market access in 
China’s case) would make it financially infeasible to maintain the price support 
program, given the large size of the Chinese grain sector and very limited budget for 
agricultural domestic support (This is especially true when the inefficient SOEs keep 
siphoning off financial resources from banks and state budget). 
 
It is true that, as far as tariff is concerned, Chinese agricultural trade is also quite 
liberalized as illustrated in Table 1.    But key Chinese agricultural imports, including 
grain are also subject to tariff rate quota (TRQ) restriction (Table 2).    While TRQs 
are expanding over years, it is observed that: 
 
“The implementation of China’s TRQ commitments, however, has proved to be rather 
problematic.    Those who export to China express concerns as to the lack of transparency in 
the quota allocation process, since no information on the quantities and destinies of the 
TRQs is provided.    Another problem reported is that TRQs allocated to some commodities 
are too small to be commercially viable. A potential importer holding a quota for a few 
thousand metric tons of grains has to pool the quota with other shipments in order to fill a 
large grain cargo ship (which generally holds between 10 and 55 thousand tons).
5  S u c h  
practice adds transaction costs and could be further complicated if the government imposes 
restrictions on pooling.” (Jales et al, 2005, page 11) 
 












                                                        
5  Lohmar and Skully (2003)   7
Table 2: China’s TRQ Commitments for Agricultural Products 
 
Source: United States General Accounting Office, “Report to Congressional Committees: Analysis of China’s 
Commitments to Other Members,” GAO-03-04 (October 2002), via Jales et al (2005) page 12.    Note: TRQs on 
soybean oil, palm oil, and rapeseed oil were planned for elimination on 1 January 2006. 
 
Thanks in part to the protectionist grain trade policy, different patterns exist in 
Chinese foreign trade in agriculture and manufacture.    Figure 3 shows that while 
Chinese overall foreign trade is growing at an exponential rate, its agricultural trade 
remains flat.    While share of agriculture in world trade is declining over the past 
decade, it still accounts for as much as 9% of world trade in total and 11% for 
developing countries in 2003.    In comparison, agricultural share in Chinese foreign 
trade is below 4% for the same year.    More striking is the fact that the global 
agricultural GDP share has fallen to one-thirtieth today and 1.8% for developed 
countries, while in China the share is as high as 14.5% in 2002.    In terms of 
agricultural share in total employment, the comparison is even sharper: 43.4% for 
China versus less than 2% in developed countries.
6   
                                                        
6  Agricultural products are defined in the Annex to the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture,   8
 
Figure 3: Agriculture in Total Trade, in billion $. 




















Source: China Customs Statistics, various years, author’s calculation 
 
Contrary to a widely circulated graph showing that Chinese agricultural trade is 
expanding in a significant way along the line of its comparative advantage, e.g., in 
Rosen et al (2004) (Figure 3.1 on page 38), when trade data are carefully grouped into 
various agricultural products, it is shown that Chinese agricultural trade patterns have 
not changed very much in the past 10 years as far as trade balance is concerned, 
except for a sharp rise in soy and cotton imports in recent years (Figure 4)
7 which 
will be discussed in the next section.    Histogram analysis over a time span of 18 
years (1980-1997) finds stronger evidence of persistent trade patterns in agriculture 
than in manufacture and primary products (Carter and Li, 2002).    Of course, in 
addition to protectionist grain trade policy in China, barriers to Chinese horticultural 
exports, often disguised protectionism in the forms of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
and technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures, also contribute to the slow 
improvement in Chinese agricultural trade patterns along the line of its comparative 
advantage, despite the fact that through intra- and inter-sectoral adjustment, much 










                                                                                                                                                               
hereafter.    Except for China, all numbers in this paragraph come from Anderson and Martin (2005). 
7  A graph of this kind first appears in Carter and Li (2002) using inflation adjusted data for 1980 - 
1997.   9
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Source: China Customs Statistics, various years, author’s calculation 
 
As part of its WTO accession commitment, China is opening up its grain trade 
through lowering the tariffs and expansion of the TRQs over years until 2006.    But 
in the first years after the accession, bad weather in North America reduced grain 
exports to China, and at the same time, grain reserve that was built up during the late 
1990s started to be released to domestic and even international markets.    Those 
incidents helped buffer the pressure of grain import.    As a result, we did not see a 
surge in grain import until 2005, when import pressure began to be felt. 
 
Poor transport infrastructure has often been cited as a reason for the lack of integrated 
domestic agricultural market.    Cotton producers in Chinese northwestern Xinjiang 
autonomous region have difficulties shipping their produce to the textile and clothing 
factories in the eastern region and transportation subsidies they received have become 
a controversial issue in the WTO agriculture negotiations.    Similarly, soybeans 
produced in Chinese northeastern provinces have a hard time reaching the coastal oil 
crushing facilities.    Needless to say, the weak transport infrastructure also serves as a 
natural barrier to the expansion of Chinese agricultural trade.    So do the grain 
reserve system and the low degree of marketization in Chinese agriculture. 
 
4. The political economy of Chinese agricultural trade policy 
 
Differing patterns of agricultural protections in rich and poor countries can be 
explained based on economics as well as countries’ unique political systems.    Rich 
countries, such as US, EU and Japan, have a small number of farmers compared to the 
total population, and it is easier for them to form a united front to lobby for 
agricultural protection.    Fluctuations of agricultural harvest due to weather 
dependence, incidents of food shortage or famine in recent history, and 
not-so-justifiable “multi-functionality” argument
8  all help draw public sympathy for 
                                                        
8  Anderson (2000) refutes the claim that agriculture deserves more price support and import protection 
than other sectors because of the non-marketed externalities and public goods it produces jointly with   10
farmers and put in place protectionist agricultural policies and support programs in 
those  countries.  Total  expenditure to subsidize agriculture may not be small, but is 
much more affordable for rich countries, given relatively small shares of agriculture in 
the economy and of farmers in the total  population.  Though  taxpayers  and 
consumers have to foot the bill, they are generally tolerant with the small per capita 
burden imposed on them (Anderson, 1995).    Political systems also play a role.    For 
example, the US electoral system makes farmers over-represented in the Congress and 
helps perpetuate its farm support programs. 
 
China’s case is just the opposite.    The large peasant population makes it virtually 
impossible to overcome the free-rider problem in forming a farm lobby and it is just 
financially infeasible to subsidize agriculture, which currently has over 40% of 
China’s total employment.    Economics aside, traditionally, China’s official ideology 
favors proletariat workers in the SOEs over peasants simply because the latter as 
private citizens own properties or means of production.    Furthermore, China does not 
have a law that legitimizes nationwide independent trade union and any trade 
associations have to be affiliated with a government agency.    Farmers’ union or 
association is no exception.    As a result, Chinese peasants have very limited 
influence on agricultural trade policy making.    Unlike agricultural protections in the 
US that have been deeply embedded into its economic and political establishments, 
“grain self-sufficiency” policy, the cornerstone of Chinese agricultural policy, has 
much weaker institutional underpinnings and is susceptible to the influence of many 
interest groups. 
 
The official attitude toward private ownership is changing and to own a property is 
less politically incorrect than before.    The most significant change in official 
ideology toward private ownership is the “Three Represents Theory”, the masterpiece 
of the former Communist Party Secretary General Jiang Zemin under which 
successful private businessmen are welcome to join the ruling party and business 
interests are given a bigger say in policy making. 
 
The “grain self-sufficiency” policy was the product of the Cold War Era which was 
punctuated by embargo and famine for China.    Now China has a whole new 
international environment and the “grain self-sufficiency” doctrine is facing 
challenges from both within and outside China.    Chinese policy community is 
debating whether or not it is justifiable to pursue this costly doctrine.    However, 
because the embargo and famine are all too near in memory, it takes time for the 
leadership to change their perception of the evolving “grain security” issue.     
 
Domestic liberalization has left market as the sole regulator of grain production, but 
WTO accession commitments have opened the door (up to TRQ limits) for imports 
that makes it difficult to maintain sufficiently high domestic grain prices.    To boost 
grain production through farm subsidies, though allowed under China’s accession 
                                                                                                                                                               
marketable food and fibre (agriculture's so-called 'multifunctionality').   11
protocol, is not a financially viable option, given its sheer size and the large number 
of farmers engaging in grain production.    Water shortage in China’s grain-belt and 
over-use of farm chemicals also raise the environmental concerns of grain production 
(Murphy,  2004).     
 
Chinese peasants are in no position to influence the agricultural policy making in the 
same way as their US and EU counterparts do.    But the urban-rural divide and the 
plight of the Chinese peasants do pose a threat to social stability, which is the 
overwhelming concern for the leadership.    Also out of the need to create a rural 
market for the demand-driven economic growth, the Chinese leadership is taking rural 
development as a serious matter in an unprecedented manner by including the NRD 
into the platform of the Eleventh Five Year Plan.    The NRD program will certainly 
inject more investment into rural area and agricultural sector, but its impact on grain 
production would be ambiguous.    First of all, the NRD program may have positive 
effects on grain production by helping improve the rural infrastructure, but funds 
available to the ambitious program will be limited.    The politically powerful SOEs 
still receive huge amount of subsidies through easy loans and from state budget that 
leaves the government with little room for financial maneuver.    FDI has played a 
vital role in Chinese urban and industrial development, but as a commercial operation, 
little has gone and will go to the rural area.    Secondly, the NRD program consists of 
a long list of projects that will compete for funds with the already shoe-string 
operation of grain production subsidies, such as investment projects for rural 
infrastructure, health care and education, among others.    Finally, with better 
infrastructure, health care and education services, factor mobility will be improved, 
which will accelerate the process of factor (and product) market integration and 
production adjustment away from grain production (Zhong et al, 2006).    Therefore, 
the net effects of NRD on grain production would be undetermined.   
 
To raise farmers’ income is a key goal of the NRD program.    Given limited resources, 
one feasible approach is to correct remaining distortions within agriculture.    This 
includes equal opportunities to credit, inputs, R&D funds and logistic support, etc, for 
all agricultural productions, in addition to price liberalization.  Resources  devoted  to 
grain price support program should be re-directed to more productive or profitable use 
in agriculture.    This will certainly boost horticultural and other labor-intensive 
production and draw resources from the grain sector, as the correction progresses.   
Since Chinese agricultural liberalization has come along in this direction, this intra 
agricultural correction alone may not suffice to raise farmers’ income in a significant 
way.    From a global point of view, Chinese farmers could benefit enormously from 
the expansion of labor-intensive production, notably, horticulture, where lies its 
comparative advantage.    But the comparative advantage of Chinese agriculture can 
not be exploited to its fullest potential unless land and other resources, which are 
limited, are released from the grain sector.    This is possible only if and when grain 
trade is liberalized.
9 
                                                        
9  Increase in horticultural production may result in domestic price decline or terms of trade   12
 
Chinese population (particularly city dwellers) with rising living standard is asking 
for more processed and convenient, better packaged, and quality food over raw farm 
products.    In response, food processing industries and agribusinesses are flourishing.   
At the same time, global trade liberalization in manufactures creates plenty of room 
for the expansion of Chinese textile and clothing sector that uses cotton as the major 
input.    In some cases, however, their interests may not be consistent with those of 
domestic producers of primary agricultural inputs. 
 
Soy was once among the strategic commodities whose self-sufficiency was 
encouraged.  Chinese  Ministry  of  Science and Technology also made huge 
investment in R&D in genetic modification (GM) technology to boost soy production.   
To meet the rising domestic demand for quality cooking oil, many crushing facilities 
had been established in China’s coastal region by the late 1990s.    Unable to access 
domestic soy, most of which are produced in Northeastern China, the oil crushing 
industry successfully lobbied the government to open up soy imports in 2001, despite 
of oppositions from domestic stake-holders.    A similar idea is floating around as to 
whether or not to open up import of corn feed to meet the demand of animal, dairy 
and meat industries. 
 
Another strategic commodity is cotton.    Chinese negotiators worked very hard to 
secure a quota limit to protect cotton sector in the accession negotiations, but China’s 
textile and clothing industry was under expansion in anticipation of the expiry of the 
Multi-fibre Arrangement by 2004 and in need of cheap cotton, a key input for the 
industry.    As a result, the National Development and Reform Commission allowed 
the import of cotton well above the quota limit at the in-quota tariff rate starting 2003. 
 
WTO negotiations are across sectoral in nature and agricultural trade agreements are 
often linked with the negotiation outcomes in other areas.    When presented with a 
possible trade deal, the top leadership will weigh the agricultural interests against 
other more powerful constituencies, for example, those in telecom, banking and 
insurance sectors, if a trade-off has to be made. 
 
Pressure to liberalize grain trade can also be felt from outside China.    The Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture has a built-in agenda for trade talks on the three 
pillars of agricultural support, namely, market access, domestic support and export 
assistance.    At the Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting, significant progress in modality 
talks on the last two issues was achieved and negotiations on market access are 
ongoing.    Among the three pillars, China has no export assistance and almost zero, if 
not negative,
10 domestic  support.  Market  access  is the only defense interest for 
                                                                                                                                                               
deterioration, but this problem could be solved by upgrading the products for high-end domestic or 
international markets.    Again, this requires other inputs, not just unskilled labor. 
10  Because of various fees and taxes imposed on farmers, Chinese agriculture in fact was receiving 
negative overall support for years until recently, according to Sun Dongsheng in his presentation at the   13
China in the negotiations.    Among the Five Interested Parties that lead the 
agriculture negotiations, US, Brazil and Australia all have an ambitious agenda in 
market access, and the US and Australia are the top source countries of Chinese grain 
imports.    In ongoing China-Australia FTA talks, Australia insists to have a 
comprehensive FTA, i.e., free trade for all commodities with no exception to wheat, 
barley and other grain products.    Pressure to import more rice from ASEAN exists, 
though China has successfully have rice excluded from the China-ASEAN FTA 
agreement. 
 
5. China in the WTO and FTA negotiations 
 
Having brought Chinese agricultural trade policy into perspective, we now turn to the 
Chinese foreign trade relations with a focus on agriculture, followed by discussions 
on Chinese positions in WTO agriculture negotiations and on China’s FTA talks with 
ASEAN  and  Australia.    
 
5.1 Agriculture in Chinese foreign trade relations 
 
Chinese agricultural trade relations can be well understood from the viewpoints of 
labor/land endowment, climate, geography and cultural proximity with its neighbors.   
Figure 5 shows the distribution of Chinese agricultural imports by region.    North 
America (US and Canada) has been the traditional top source country of Chinese 
agricultural imports, followed by Latin America, ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand, 
EU and Sub-Sahara Africa in 2003.    There has been a sharp rise in imports from 
Latin America since 2000, largely because China opened up its soy imports in 2001 
and Brazil and Argentina have been major soy exporters to China.    This policy alone 
has brought Latin America to the rank of second-largest source of agricultural imports, 
following closely first-ranked North America.     
 




























Source: China Customs Statistics, author’s calculation, data in Appendix 
                                                                                                                                                               
conference on “Globalization, Market Integration, Agricultural Support Policy and Smallholders,” 
Nanjing, China, November 8-9, 2004.   14
 
On the export side, Japan is the top destination, followed by ASEAN, Hong Kong, 
China, South Korea, EU and North America in 2003 (Figure 6).    In the case of Hong 
Kong, one has to be aware of the problem that it is a gateway for Chinese exports to 
the world and goods recorded as exports to Hong Kong may actually be destined for a 
third country.    Since 1993, the Chinese Customs has been trying to identify the final 
destinations of Chinese exports but the work can not be exhaustive because Chinese 
exporters and even the Hong Kong traders who run the re-export business really don’t 
know the final destination when the goods clear the Chinese customs as exports and 
clear the Hong Kong customs as imports.    Only when goods are further processed in 
Hong Kong and sorting is done there, can Hong Kong traders know where exactly 
goods will be eventually shipped to.    That’s why the Hong Kong import data does 
not have information on final destination and only re-export data has (Feenstra et al, 
1998).    This fact gives us confidence that ASEAN occupies a solid second place 
among China’s agricultural export destinations.     
 
Comparing Figures 5 and 6, we see that they are in sharp contrast and that except with 
ASEAN, China has imbalanced trade with all other major agricultural trading partners, 
importing mainly from North and Latin Americas and exporting mainly to Asian 
neighboring countries. 
 
































Source: China Customs Statistics, author’s calculation, data in Appendix 
 
Chinese agricultural trade relations shown in Figures 5 and 6 can be easily understood 
by resource endowments in China and those countries.    China is labor abundant but 
land scarce relative to North and Latin Americas and this explains Chinese imports of 
wheat, barley, maize, soy and cotton from there.    If comparison is made between 
labor/land and capital, China certainly has comparative advantages in agriculture and 
that’s why China exports mainly agricultural products (as well as labor-intensive 
manufacturing goods) to Japan, Hong Kong and South Korea (and imports capital- 
and technology-intensive industrial goods from those countries in return).     
   15
ASEAN is the only region that has a balanced agricultural trade with China.    These 
two regions do not differ distinctly in relative factor endowments.  Rather,  climate 
makes a difference in determining bilateral agricultural trade patterns.  China  exports 
temperate horticultural products and grains (except rice), soy and cotton to ASEAN, 
while it imports mostly tropical products and rice from ASEAN. 
 
Geographical proximity makes it easier for China to export perishable horticultural 
products to its neighbors.    Historically, those countries have been influenced by 
Chinese culture and some even have a large ethnic Chinese population.    China-made 
agricultural products are particularly in demand in these regions.  Finally,  stringent 
SPS rules in the EU and the US turn Chinese agricultural exports nowhere but to its 
neighboring developing countries.    The success of Chinese horticultural exports to 
Japan is largely due to Japanese investment in China in horticultural production and 
processing, which helps improve the quality of Chinese exports to Japan and meet its 
stringent SPS requirements (Wu Huang, 2002). 
 
5.2 China in WTO agriculture negotiations 
 
Since China started to participate in the WTO agriculture negotiations, a lot of 
attention in the international trade policy area has been on China, the largest 
developing member, as to what role it would play in the agriculture negotiations.   
Interests in China have intensified after China joined the G20 at the Cancun WTO 
Ministerial Meeting in September 2003.    So far China has left an impression that it is 
a low-key player and lacks a clear position.    True as it is, this subsection tries to 
explain why China chose to take a low profile, in comparison to Brazil, the leader of 




China is a net importer of cotton and soy, and a potential net importer of grain.   
These products are subsidized in the US, which is the major source of Chinese 
imports.    Subsidized exports benefit China as a whole and are very much welcomed 
by China’s textile and clothing industry and oil crushing industry.    But they run 
against its grain self-sufficiency policy, which has been the primary reason for 
Chinese opposition to agricultural subsidies in developed countries.    China’s 
ambiguity in agriculture negotiations reflects this dilemma and this raises the question 
as to whether China, as a net grain importer, will stay in G20, a question we will turn 
to at the end of this subsection.   
 
As for market access, one of the three pillars in agriculture negotiations, grain sector 
has most of China’s defense interest, which is limited but sensitive.    Its offense 
interest lies in horticultural exports.    Though there is room for further tariff reduction 
in export markets, barriers of the first order to Chinese horticultural exports are not 
tariffs, but disguised protectionism in the forms of SPS and TBT, which are not on the 
                                                        
11  For a comparative study on the Brazilian and Chinese agricultures, see Jales et al (2005).   16
negotiation agenda of the Doha Round.    As a result, there is indeed no strong 
incentive for China to push for liberalization in market access.    Of course, as a new 
member, weak negotiating capacity is also a reason why China is not pushing for 
agricultural trade reform as hard as Brazil. 
 
In contrast, Brazil is the net exporter of many agricultural products and is in direct 
competition with US and EU exporters.    Subsidies in developed countries hurt 
Brazilian soy, cotton, sugar and beef industries.    Furthermore, the European Union, 
which zealously guards its domestic market through various border measures, is the 
top destination of Brazilian agricultural exports.    As such, Brazil has every reason to 
push very hard for liberalization in all three pillars of agriculture negotiations, which 
will unambiguously benefit Brazilian agriculture as well as its national economy as a 
whole. 
 
Will China stay in the G20?    While it would be possible in theory to have all Chinese 
sectors benefit from foreign-subsidized grain imports through a carefully-defined 
taxation and transfer payment scheme, it would be politically infeasible for the 
Ministry of Agriculture, which is in charge of agriculture negotiations, to give 
concessions to foreign countries and seek concessions from other Chinese ministries.   
After all, negotiations at home are the most difficult part of the whole trade 
negotiations, a sentiment shared by many negotiators.    For this reason, this author 
believes that China will choose to stay in the G20. 
 
5.3 China in free trade agreements (FTAs) negotiations 
 
Immediately after China entered the WTO in 2001, the Government of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region proposed to establish a Closer Economic 
Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) with China.    Shortly after that, the Government of 
Macao Special Administrative Region made a similar proposal.    Those proposals 
received lukewarm reactions from Beijing at the beginning.    But in 2003 when the 
region was hit by SARS crisis, the Central Government moved to seal the deals with 
Hong Kong and Macao as a confidence building measure.    The two CEPAs are the 
first FTAs for China. 
 
The idea for a China-Japan-Korea FTA has long been entertained among scholars but 
has never entered into the negotiation  phase.  Political  tension between China and 
Japan is an often cited reason why no progress is made so far.    But protectionist 
agricultural trade policies in Korea and Japan are also to blame.    On the other hand, 
substantial progress has been made in China’s FTA talks with ASEAN, Australia, New 
Zealand and Chile.     
 
This subsection explores the relationship between FTA and the WTO multilateral 
negotiations with particular reference to China-ASEAN and China-Australia FTAs.   
One frequently asked question on this issue is whether the former helps the latter, or   17
whether a FTA is a building block or stumbling block to multilateral negotiations.   
Literature on this topic is abundant but there is no definite answer (Winters 1996).   
Instead of attempting to answer such a general question, I pose two specific questions 
as follows: 
 
1.  Will FTA-induced production adjustment in grain sector be consistent with 
that potentially induced by future multilateral liberalization? 
2.  Will the China-Japan rivalry in their FTA negotiations with ASEAN or a 
possible China-Australia FTA generate any positive dynamics for WTO 
agriculture negotiations? 
 
In subsequent discussions on the second question, I use Figure 7 to illustrate the trade 
patterns of key grains among China, ASEAN, Australia, Japan and the US. 
 
 
Figure 7 Rice versus Wheat Triangle 
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As discussed in Section 5.1, ASEAN is the only trading partner of China that has 
significant agricultural trade in both imports  and  exports.  China-ASEAN  FTA, 
which entered into force on July 1, 2003, is designed to eliminate 99% of tariffs and is 
considered as one of a few quality FTAs characterized by comprehensive market 
access liberalization and manageable provisions on rules of origin (Cheong, 2006).   
In this regard, it is only second to the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic 
Relations, the only FTA in the world in which all tariffs and quantitative restrictions 
on trade in goods are eliminated.    Indeed, unlike many other FTAs negotiated in 
recent years that normally excluded agriculture, agriculture was negotiated upfront in 
China-ASEAN FTA and is the key component of its Early Harvest Program.    Most 
agricultural trade, except a few sensitive ones such as ASEAN rice exports to China, 










To the first question, the answer is no.    In relation with ASEAN, China has a 
regional comparative advantage in non-rice grain but a global disadvantage in the 
same agricultural products.    Chinese exports of non-rice grain to ASEAN will 
expand as a result of the FTA.    But if breakthrough is made in the WTO agriculture 
negotiations in the area of market access, China would certainly import more grain 
which will depress China’s grain production.    The opposite movement of resources 
in the grain sector represents the elements in the China-ASEAN FTA that are not 
consistent with the multilateral liberalization.
12 
 
As for the second question, I focus on rice, which is the only crop sensitive for WTO 
talks and at the same time significant for all three parties involved.    In this sense, rice 
is the only agricultural product that, if liberalization is achieved in FTA talks, would 
have a positive impact on the multilateral negotiations.    As shown in Figure 7, in the 
rice triangle, China and Japan are on defense, while ASEAN is on offense. 
 
However, in the China-ASEAN FTA deal, rice is exempt from liberalization.    Then, 
with this precedence on the part of China, it is not a surprise to see Japan has also 
excluded rice in its FTA with Thailand.    For the same reason, it is very unlikely that 
Japan would make any concessions in rice market access in FTA negotiations with 
ASEAN in order to compete with China.     
 
On the other hand, trade diversion for Japan as a result of China-ASEAN FTA may 
pressure Japan to seal its FTA deal with ASEAN as soon as possible, but there is no 
indication that Japan has to resort to rice liberalization to  woo  ASEAN.  In  fact, 
ASEAN6 exports to Japan twice as much as it does to China, and Japan has enough 
chips in its hand in the talks.     
 
Furthermore, a swift FTA deal between China and ASEAN benefits from the fact that 
the two regions have quite similar economic structure.    Both are emerging markets 
with a significant agricultural sector and a mostly labor-intensive manufacturing 
sector.  Therefore,  politically  sensitive products are very few and the FTA 
negotiations encountered little domestic opposition.    But Japan and ASEAN have 
quite different or more complementary economic structures and therefore more 
contentious issues would come up in the negotiations.    For example, in addition to 
rice, Japanese luxury cars are also a sensitive issue for Thailand, which has been 
excluded from the deal, as noted in Pasadilla  (2005).  Trade  talks  are  about 
reciprocity.    In light of this, rice liberalization could hardly be brought onto the 
agenda in the Japan-ASEAN FTA talks before many other sticking points are cleared.   
In short, with rice as an untouchable issue, China-Japan rivalry in their FTA 
negotiations with ASEAN can hardly generate any positive dynamics for WTO 
agriculture negotiations. 
 
                                                        
12  A similar case for Viet Nam can be found in World Bank (2005), Box 6.2, p132.     19
China-Australia FTA 
 
The proposed China-Australia FTA is significant for both countries.    For China, it is 
the first FTA with a developed country.    Since China’s accession to the WTO, 
anti-dumping investigations of Chinese products in the US and EU have often been 
conducted with invocation of the non-market economy status clause in China’s 
accession protocol.    To seek recognition of its market economy status has been a top 
priority in Chinese foreign trade diplomacy, and is also part of the FTA deal with 
Australia.    To strengthen the trade relations with Australia also conforms to China’s 
need for secured energy supply to fuel its fast growing economy.   
 
To have unfettered access to Chinese market is the primary motivation for the FTA on 
the part of Australia, and this is particularly important for Australian minerals, energy 
and agricultural exports.    Talks with China have gained momentum since Australia 
reached an FTA agreement with the United States in February 2004, partly in response 




Given the enormous economic benefit from a potential FTA (Mai et al, 2005) and the 
strategic importance of mutual engagement between the two large countries in the 
Asian Pacific region, the FTA initiative enjoys high level political support in the two 
Governments.  However,  negotiations  have been stalled over the treatment of 
Australian grain exports to China: while Australia aims for a comprehensive FTA, 
China insists that grain should be exempt as sensitive products from liberalization.    It 
is beyond the scope of this paper to speculate on the negotiation outcomes, but I will 
offer some analysis of the grain issue in a possible comprehensive China-Australia 
FTA, in an attempt to answer the two questions raised in the early part of this 
sub-section. 
 
To the first question, the answer is yes.   A  comprehensive  FTA  with Australia will 
increase Chinese grain imports, as Australia has a comparative advantage in grain 
production in relation with China.    From a global perspective, Chinese agriculture 
does not have a comparative advantage in grain production, and with the progress in 
agricultural market access negotiations at the WTO, China will certainly increase 
grain  imports.  Adjustment  in  Chinese  grain production in response to trade 
liberalization induced by a comprehensive China-Australia FTA will be an 
intermediate step towards multilateral liberalization in agriculture. 
 
Again referring to Figure 7, a comprehensive China-Australia FTA would give 
Australia a preferential margin over the US in access to Chinese grain market.   
Given the credentials as the champion for global agricultural trade reform, Australia 
                                                        
13  For example, Ross Garnaut, a prominent critic of the Australia-US FTA and politically allied with 
the opposition party, often uses the “stumbling block” concept (Bhagwati, 1993) in formulating his 
argument in popular media.   20
will not stop pushing for the multilateral process at the WTO.    On the other hand, the 
US would be disadvantaged in its grain exports to China.    To form a US-China FTA 
is almost impossible in the near future, and a comprehensive China-Australia FTA 
will only pressure the US to more actively pursue agricultural reform at the WTO, 
particularly in market access, the area most critical to the WTO agriculture 




Chinese agricultural reform has made much progress in the past but there is still a 
long way to go to fully integrate with the world trading system.    Analysis of the 
political economy of Chinese agricultural trade policy indicates that, though a 
strongly held belief, the “grain security” perception is changing as a result of evolving 
political and economic environment both at home and abroad.    China’s unique trade 
patterns and its emphasis on “grain self-sufficiency” can explain the ambiguity of its 
positions in the WTO agriculture negotiations.    There is no clear indication whether 
or not China-ASEAN FTA will help with the multilateral progress but the FTA deal 
does result in the movement of resources into China’s grain sector (except rice), 
which is not in the same direction as the multilateral liberalization would lead to.   
However, the China-Australia FTA, if a comprehensive one, would have a different 
impact in terms of grain production adjustment and it would also generate pressure to 
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